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WHAT QUESTIONS OF MINING LAW HAVE
BEEN DECIDED IN THE LITIGATION
OVER THE DRUM LUMMON
LODE OR VEIN
By John B. Clayberg, of the Montana Bar.
The Drum Lummon lode or vein, which is situated in Lewis and
Clark County, Montana, is a natural deposit of mineral from
which vast amounts of money have been extracted. The peculiar
situation of the vein or lode with reference to adjacent mining
locations, through which it passes, has been the cause of very
extensive litigation which has settled numerous interesting ques-
tions, most of which were new in the mining law at the time they
arose and were decided. A review of the litigation will disclose
these various questions and the decisions of the courts upon them,
which will be of interest to that part of the profession who are
conversant with mining law and, because of their singularity, may
interest the profession generally.
This lode or vein was discovered by an old miner by the
name of Thomas Cruse, who located the Drum Lummon quartz
lode mining claim on such discovery. Development disclosed its
immense value and Mr. Cruse sold it to some Englishmen, who
organized the Montana Company, Limited, an English corpora
tion, which took over the property and worked it for many years.
From time to time, after purchasing the Drum Lummon lode, the
Montana Company, Limited, acquired other claims, into or
through which this great lode entered or passed, either upon its
dip or strike. Other adjoining locations, affected by the lode, were
acquired by others, and serious litigation ensued over conflicting
rights in this vein or lode. The following map (inserted for the
purpose of explaining the location of the vein with reference to
the various claims), discloses the surface of the various mining
locations along the course or strike of the vein for over two
thousand feet. The apex or top of the vein on its strike or course
is marked by dotted lines, which indicate the foot and hanging
walls of the vein. The hanging wall of a vein is the line of
separation between the vein and the adjoining country rock along
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the upper side of the vein on its dip, and the foot wall is the line
of separation between the vein and the adjoining country rock
along the lower side of the vein on its dip.
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The first litigation in which any questions of interest arose was
instituted against the owners of the Hopeful quartz claim, which
was a fractional location in the form of a triangle, lying adjacent
to the Drum Lummon location, and along the southwesterly por-
tion thereof, as disclosed on the above map by the small triangle
marked Hopeful. This suit was brought by the Montana Com-
pany, Limited, against Clark and others, owners of the Hope-
ful claim, for the purpose of enjoining them from sinking a
shaft on the vein-following its dip--to such an extent that it
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would break into the Cruse level, so-called, which was a drift or
level excavated by the Montana Company, Limited, along the
course of the Drum Lummon vein at about i4o feet beneath the
surface of the Marble Heart claim, owned by that company. The
apex of the Drum Lummon lode at the point where the shaft was
started was within the surface boundaries of the Hopeful claim,
but the descent of the vein into the earth was at such an. angle,
that it departed from the vertical boundaries of the Hopeful
claim and passed underneath the surface boundaries of the Mar-
ble Heart claim above mentioned.
The action was defended by Clark and others, on the theory
that having the apex of the lode within the surface boundaries of
the Hopeful claim, they had the right to follow the vein on its dip
or descent into the earth to its uttermost depth, even though it
departed from the vertical boundaries of the Hopeful claim. This
right was claimed under what is known as the "extralateral"
right grant by Section 2322 R. S. U. S. The right is given by this
section to the owners of any quartz mining location to follow all
veins having their apices or tops within the vertical boundaries of
the claim or location, on their downward course or descent into
the earth, although they so far depart from the perpendicular as
to pass outside of such vertical boundaries and enter beneath the
surface of the adjoining claims. This right extends to the utter-
most depth of the vein, but is limited on the strike or course of the
vein by vertical planes dropped through the end lines of the loca-
tion and'extended in their own direction until they intersect the
vein on the dip. This right is known in mining parlance as the
"extralateral right."
The Montana Company, Limited, contended that the form or
shape of the surface of the Hopeful location was such that the
claim had no extralateral rights, relying upon the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Horse Shoe Case
(so-called)," which held that the end lines of a mining claim
must be parallel to each other in order to give such claim extra-
lateral rights. Judge Knowles sustained the company's conten-
tion, and held that a mining claim in the form of a triangle and,
therefore, having no parallel boundaries, had no extralateral
rights. As a matter of fact, the Hopeful claim had been located in
the form of a parallelogram, with the Drum Lummon lode or vein
on its course or strike, passing through two parallel end lines.
I xi8 U. S., 2o8.
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Portions of the surface of the claim so located, conflicted with
prior locations, and upon the patenting of the Hopeful claim, such
conflicting portions were excluded, and title was given only to the
remainder of the surface of that claim. Judge Knowles held that
under the doctrine of Belk v. Meagher,2 no ground could be in-
cluded within the limits of a mining location which was then in-
cluded within the limits of another existing valid location. The
Supreme Court of the United States afterwards held that while
the right of possession of only unappropriated public domain could
be obtained by location, yet, a locator, for the purpose of securing
unappropriated extralateral rights, might set the stakes marking
his boundaries, upon othe1" valid locations, and include the land
thus bounded in his location, but subject to the rights of prior
locations.3
This decision of Judge Knowles is an anomaly, holding that the
owners of the Hopeful claim had no right to follow the vein on
its dip after it passed through any of the vertical boundaries of
their location, because the claim had no extralateral rights, owing
to its shape or form; that the Montana Company, Limited, did not
own the vein beyond that point because it did not own the apex
thereof, or the ground in which it was situated; that the govern-
ment owned, but could not transfer the title to the vein after it
passed through the vertical boundaries of the Hopeful claim,
without further legislation, because it had sold the land in which
the apex of the vein was included, and the statute did not provide
for a separate sale or transfer of any portion of a vein, but only
the surface ground which included the apex of a vein therein.
No appeal was taken in this case because it was ascertained that
the particular part or portion of the Drum Lummon vein or lode




The next important litigation regarding the Drmn Lummon
lode or vein, originated in an application of the owners of the St.
Louis claim, for an order of inspection and survey of the work-
ings of the Montana Company, Limited, on the dip of the vein
210o4 U. S., 279.
3 Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U. S., 55.
4 This case is reported under the the title of Montana Co., Limited, v.
Clark, 42 Fed., 626.
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underneath the surface of the Marble Heart, the Maskelyne and
the Nine-Hour Mining claims for the purpose of ascertaining the
amount and value of ore alleged to have been extracted by the
Montana Company, Limited, on the dip of the vein and beneath
the surface boundaries of their locations, and claimed by the St.
Louis Company because extracted from a vein which apexed with-
in the surface boundaries of a mining claim owned by that com-
pany.
The application was made to a District Court of the State of
Montana under the provisions of a statute of that State. The
above map discloses the relative position of all of these claims and
the apex of the Drum Lummon lode or vein.
This inspection was sought for the purpose of procuring evi-
dence upon which to base a suit against the Montana Company,
Limited, to recover the value of the ore extracted by that com-
pany beneath the surface of its locations, and from a vein on its
dip, which apexed within the location owned. by the St. Louis
Company. This inspection was granted by the State District
Court. The Montana Company, Limited, claiming that the statute
was unconstitutional, appealed to the Supreme Court of the State,
where the statute was held constitutional and the order affirmed. "
The Montana Company, Limited, then removed the case to the
Supreme Court of the United States, claiming that the statute vio-
lated the Constitution of the United States, in that it permitted
one to be deprived of his property without due process of law.
This court, however, held that the statute was not in violation of
any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
and affirmed the order of the State Court.6  While the
power of ordering an inspection and survey under similar cir-
cumstances, had been held to be inherently vested in courts of
equity, this decision is a leading case upon the constitutionality and
validity of such a statute.
C.
The next important litigation was a suit brought by the Mon-
tana Company, Limited, to obtain a decree for the specific per-
formance of a certain bond given by Charles Mayger, the locator
of the St. Louis claim, in settlement of an adverse claim and suit
filed by the owners of the Nine-Hour claim, against the applica-
5 This case was reported in 9 Mont., p. 288.
a 152 U. S., i6o.
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tion for a patent for the St. Louis claim. This adverse and suit
were based upon allegations that the surface of the Nine-Hour lo-
cation conflicted with or overlapped a portion of the surface of
the St. Louis location, and that claim being the older location
in point of time, the area covered by such conflict belonged to
the Nine-Hour claim. The owners of the two claims met and
agreed that the adverse claim should be withdrawn, the suit dis-
missed, and Mayger be allowed to proceed to patent, and after
receiving such patent, to convey to the owners of the Nine-Hour
claim a strip thirty feet wide along the southwestern side line of
the St. Louis claim between corners numbered 2 and 3 of the
patented description therebf. The owner of the St. Louis claim
then gave a bond in the penal sum of $i,5oo to make this convey-
ance. This strip, ever since this settlement, has been known and
described as the "Compromise Strip," and has caused extensive
litigation. This compromise strip is shown on the map marked
"Compromise Strip" for identification. This specific perform-
ance suit was defended on several grounds, but the defense per-
taining to mining law was that the settlement of such adverse
claim and suit was against public policy, fraudulent _against the
government, and absolutely void. The lower court, however, held
to the contrary and granted the decree of specific performance.
The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Montana and
this ruling was affirmed.' The case was afterwards removed to
the Supreme Court of the United States, where the decree ap-
pealed from was also affirmed. s Pursuant to this decree a convey-
ance of the "Compromise Strip" was executed and delivered.
This is a leading case upon the question whether such a settle-
ment violates the Acts of Congress, relative to mines.
D.
In 1893, the St. Louis Mining Company, the then owner of the
St. Louis claim, instituted suit against the Montana Mining Com-
pany (the successor to the Montana Company, Limited) to recover
the value of ores extracted beneath the surface of the claims
lying east of the St. Louis (owned by the Montana Mining
Company) on the dip of the Drum Lummon lode or vein, between
planes parallel with the end lines of the St. Louis claim dropped
downward vertically through the points where the apex of the
2o Mont., 394.
s171 U. S., 650.
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lode or vein entered into and departed from the St. Louis claim on
its course or strike. The main questions litigated in this case
were:
i. Did the St. Louis claim have any extralateral rights on the
Drum Lummon vein or lode; and
2. If so, what was the extent of such rights?
It was contended by the Montana Mining Company that no
such rights existed because by the conveyance given pursuant to
the decree in the specific performance case, the compromise strip
had been conveyed by a specific description "together with all
minerals therein contained," and that, under this conveyance, the
extralateral rights of the St. Louis claim on the Drum Lummon
lode or vein were bounded on the dip of said vein, by the vertical
plane of the western boundary line of the compromise strip; and
because the Drum Lummon vein or lode entered into and de-
parted from the St. Louis Mining claim through the same side
line thereof. This company further contended that even if the
St. Louis claim possessed any extralateral rights, they only existed
between planes parallel to the end lines of the claim drawn
through points where the hanging wall of the lode entered into
and departed from the St. Louis claim; or, in other words, extra-
lateral rights only existed in a case of this kind, if at all, when
the entire apex of the lode was within the St. Louis surface
boundaries.
The St. Louis Mining Company contended that under the
statutes of the United States the St. Louis claim was entitled to
extralateral rights on this incidental vein, because it was entitled
to extralateral rights on is original or discovery vein; that the St.
Louis claim, being the older location was entitled to extralateral
rights on this vein so long as any portion of its apex was within
its surface boundaries; or, in other words, between planes parallel
to its end lines drawn through the points where the foot wall
of the Drum Lummon lode or vein entered into and departed from
the St. Louis claim. As to the language in the deed .above
referred to, the St. Louis Company contended that the deed
must be construed as a mining deed and not as a common law
deed, and that the words above quoted added nothing to the
conveyance; that such conveyance simply transferred the minerals
belonging to the compromise strip as a mining location, and that
no part of any lode or vein therein contained, the apex of which
was not within the boundaries of the compromise strip, was con-
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veyed. The question as to the point of entrance of the lode into
the St. Louis claim was not considered, as it was agreed that
no ore had been extracted by the Montana Mining Company
except at or near the point where the apex of the vein or lode de-
parted from the St. Louis claim.
It was conceded that the apex of this lode on its course or
strike departed from the St. Louis claim at the point where it
entered the compromise strip, which belonged to the Montana
Mining Company. In the first trial of this case before Judge
Knowles, United States District Judge for Montana, it was con-
ceded that the hanging wall of the lode passed out of the St.
Louis ground and into the compromise strip at a point indicated
upon the map as the io8 foot plane, and that the foot wall of the
vein passed from the St. Louis ground and into the compromise
strip at a point indicated on the map as the 133-foot plane.
Judge Knowles ruled on the trial, contrary to the Montana
Company's contention, except as to the extent of the extralateral
rights as claimed by that company, and limited the St. Louis
Mining Company's recovery to ore extracted on the dip of the
vein, beneath the surface boundaries of the "Compromise Strip,"
and the Montana Company's other locations lying to the east, north
of the io8-foot plane. The St. Louis company recovered a judg-
ment for the ore thus extracted and the Montana Company re-
moved the case to the Appellate' Court of the Ninth Circuit.
That Court sustained Judge Knowles in all the rulings complained
of, and its opinion is reported in 102 Fed., 430. The St. Louis
Company also sued out a writ of error to review the ruling of
Judge Knowles as to limiting the St. Louis Company's extra-
lateral rights to the point where the hanging wall departed from
the St. Louis ground or to the io8-foot plane. The Appellate
Court reversed the ruling of Judge Knowles on the extent of
extralateral rights, and held that the St. Louis, being the older
location in point of time, had extralateral rights on the Drum
Lummon lode or vein so long as any portion of the apex was with-
in the surface boundaries of that claim or that the extralateral
rights extended to the 133-foot plane.0 Both of these cases having
been decided by the Appellate Court adversely to the contentions
of the Montana Mining Company, that company removed the case
to the Supreme Court of the United States, but that court dis-
missed the proceedings on the ground that there was but one
9 This case is reported iti io4 Fed., 664.
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judgment, and such judgment having been reversed by the Appel-
late Court under its opinion in the io4th Federal, and a new
trial having been ordered, no judgment existed which could be
considered by the Supreme Court." The new trial was had in
19o5, under the law as established by the Appellate Court in the
102nd and io4th Federal. This trial resulted in a judgment for
the St. Louis Mining Company for $195,ooo.oo. The Montana
Company again stied out a writ of error to the Appellate Court
for the Ninth Circuit, where the judgment was affirmed."1 It
then removed the case to the United States Supreme Court by
certiorari, where the judgment was reversed and a new trial or-
dered. The reversal, however, was only upon the point that, by
the language of the deed executed pursuant to the decree of.
specific performance, namely, "together with all minerals therein
contained," there was included all minerals contained in the Drum
Lumnion lode or vein which existed within the vertical boundaries
of the compromise strip, even though the apex of such vein was
within the surface boundaries of the St. Louis claim, and that the
extralateral rights of the SL Louis claim continued to the lode on
its dip after it had crossed the eastern vertical boundaries of the
compromise strip.12
The case coming back for the third trial, the St. Louis Coin-
pany again recovered judgment for the sum of over $2o3,ooo.oo.
In the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States there
was excluded from the St. Louis Company's recovery, all ore
extracted by the Montana Mining Company beneath the surface
of .the "Compromise Strip." The Montana Mining Company
again removed the case to the Appellate Court and it was set for
hearing and argued on the 12th day of March of this year, but
no decision as yet has been reached by that court.
E.
During the progress of the last above mentioned litigation, the
St. Louis Company commenced the excavation of a tunnel, start-
ing within the surface boundaries of the St. Louis claim and ex-
tending eastward until it crossed the west vertical boundary of
the compromise strip. The intention of the St. Louis Company
was to continue this tunnel across the compromise strip and
10 This case is reported in i86 U. S., 24.
'1 147 Fed., 897.
12 This opinion is found in 2o4 U. S., 204.
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until it encountered the Drum Lummon vein on its dip, beneath
the surface of the Marble Heart claim, so that it might be able
to work that part of the vein, having its apex within the St.
Louis claim, after such vein had so far departed on its dip as
to be underneath the surface of the Nine-Hour claim and be-
yond the vertical boundaries of the "Compromise Strip." The
Montana Mining Company filed a bill in the United States Court
for the District of Montana, to enjoin the prosecution of this tun-
nel through the compromise strip or into the Nine-Hour claim.
This injunction was granted by Judge Knowles, affirmed by the
Appellate Court in the case of St. Louis Mining Company against
Montana Mining Company,18 which was afterwards removed to
the Supreme Court of the United States and affirmed by that
court.
14
The theory of the decision was, that the statute giving extra-
lateral rights to a vein gave the owners no right to enter upon
or into a claim into which the vein dipped, in any manner or
in any way save or except by following the vein from their own
land, down on its dip; that no right-of-way was given for a tun-
nel or cross-cut through another's location. This is also a leading
case upon the points decided.
The decision of Judge Knowles in the 42nd Federal supra seems
never to have been followed,- and it is not at present considered as
authority upon the questions involved.
By the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Federal Court of Appeals the following important questions
in mining law have been settled, namely:
i. That state statutes allowing an inspection and survey of the
workings of mining claims, in order to ascertain whether a tres-
pass has been committed, and if so, to determine the extent there-
of, and the value of the ore extracted, for the purpose of ascer-
taining the necessary facts for the commencement of a suit, do
not contravene the Constitution of the United States and are
valid.
2. That an adverse claim and suit against the application for
a patent of a mining claim may be settled by the parties, and
that a bond to convey a portion of one claim after patent, given in
consideration of the withdrawal of such adverse and the dismissal
's 113 Fed., goo.
219 4 U. S., 235.
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of such suit, does not contravene the mineral statutes of the
United States.
3. That a mining deed which contains the language "together
with all mineral therein contained" conveys that section of a vein
within the vertical boundaries of the surface described in the deed,
even though the apex of such vein lies outside of such boundaries.
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4. That one owning extralateral rights on a vein may convey a
section of such vein on its dip without disturbing his extralateral
rights beyond the section conveyed.
5. That extralateral rights exist upon a vein which enters anddeparts from the same boundary of a location, but only between
vertical planes parallel with the end lines of the claim, dropped
through the point of entrance and departure of the vein on its
course.
6. That in such case the prior location is entitled to the full
extralateral rights on the vein so long as any portion of the apex
thereof is found within its surface boundaries.
7. That the Act of Congress granting extralateral rights to a
vein gives no right of entry upon, across or into another loca-
tion, but only the right to follow the vein on its dip beyond the
vertical boundaries of the claim owning the extralateral rights.
None of these questions had ever before been decided by anyFederal Court of last resort, and consequently each and all the
cases above considered were leading cases upon the points in-
volved.
John B. Clayberg.
